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Notes
When is an Order Final?: A Result-Oriented
Approach to the Finality Requirement for
Bankruptcy Appeals to Federal
Circuit Courts
Imagine identical businesses in Newark, New Jersey and
New York, New York. Each has identical creditors and identi-
cal financial woes. Each seeks the protection of the federal
bankruptcy court,' and they obtain identical final decisions. On
appeal of those decisions to the federal district court2 of their
respective jurisdictions,3 the appellate court reverses and re-
mands both cases to bankruptcy court for identical further
proceedings.
At that point, the similarity of these cases ends because the
federal circuit courts in the two jurisdictions have different
views of which judicial orders are final. 4 The New Jersey ap-
pellant is entitled to immediate review of the district court's de-
1. A primary purpose of bankruptcy is to grant an individual debtor a
'fresh start' economically by relieving the debtor of the burden of debt while
permitting the debtor to retain some property. Williams v. United States Fi-
delity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. V 1987) provides, inter alia, for appeals from
final judgments in bankruptcy courts to be heard in the district courts of the
United States. See infra note 56. The question of what constitutes a final or-
der of a bankruptcy court for purposes of appeal to the district court under 28
U.S.C. § 158(d) has been litigated extensively and is not treated by this Note.
See, e.g., In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 448 (1st Cir.1983) (holding
final a ruling that a claim is entitled to priority); Moxley v. Comer (In re
Comer), 716 F.2d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding fianl a non-contingent order
lifting the automatic stay); Mason v. Integrity Ins.-Co. (In re Mason), 709 F.2d
1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding orders rendered after a final hearing on re-
lief from the final stay final).
3. The state of New York is in the Second Federal Judicial Circuit. The
state of New Jersey is in the Third Federal Judicial Circuit.
4. Handling of these cases diverges because the Second and the Third
Circuits split over how to interpret the finality requirement of their jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(Supp. V 1987). See inzfra notes 72-83 and accom-
panying text (describing the Marin approach to finality used in the Third
Circuit) and infra notes 97-103 (describing the Riggsby approach to finality de-
fined by the Seventh Circuit and adopted by the Second Circuit in LTV Corp.
v. Farragher (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 839 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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cision,5 but the New York appellant must return to the
bankruptcy court for further proceedings.6  Only after the
bankruptcy court finishes those further proceedings can the
New York appellant appeal. This delay in the appellate process
may force the New York businessperson to undergo a para-
lyzing period of uncertainty concerning the finances of the
business. This unfair result may occur even though Congress
intends bankruptcy procedures to be uniform throughout the
United States. 7
Bankruptcy matters usually begin in federal bankruptcy
courts. Appeals from bankruptcy court generally are to a fed-
eral district court or, as in the Ninth Circuit, may be heard by a
bankruptcy appellate panel.8 Appeals from either a federal dis-
trict court or a bankruptcy appellate panel are to a circuit
court. Appeals from the circuit courts may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.9
Under 28 U.S.C. section 158(d), the federal circuit courts
may review only final orders of a federal district court or ap-
pellate panel when the district court or appellate panel reviews
5. The Third Circuit considers a district court reversal and remand to
bankruptcy court a 'final order' for purposes of appeal. Matin Motor Oil, Inc.
v. Michaels, 689 F.2d 445, 449 (3d Cir. 1982).
6. The Second Circuit considers a district court reversal with remand a
non-final order for purposes of appeal. See LTV Corp., 839 F.2d at 62.
7. Bankruptcy laws are federal laws. Article I, sec. 8 of the United States
Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o establish... uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Although the
grant of authority to make bankruptcy laws is not exclusive, two obstacles ef-
fectively eliminate state bankruptcy laws. First, the doctrine of preemption
prevents any state from legislating in competition with the federal govern-
ment when Congress shows an intent to occupy a particular field. D. CowANs,
CowANs BANKRUPTcy LAw AND PRAcncE § 1.1, at 1-2 (1986). Second, the
Constitution's prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts,
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1, which applies only to the states, prevents the
states from enacting effective bankruptcy laws. Id
8. See infra note 58.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982) provides in pertinent part-
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
by the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after the rendition of judgment or
decree;
(3) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question
of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are de-
sired, and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give bind-
ing instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for decision
of the entire matter in controversy.
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orders of a bankruptcy court.10 The circuits are split over how
to interpret this finality requirement when a district court
reverses and remands a case to a bankruptcy court for further
proceedings. The lack of a uniform standard for determining fi-
nality in this situation undermines confidence in the bank-
ruptcy system and may lead to inequitable results. 1
10. Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) as part of the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(1984) (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of Titles 11 & 26
U.S.C.), in an attempt to clear up many logical and constitutional problems
with the existing bankruptcy code. Unfortunately, the attempt to clarify the
old problems in the code engendered a new problem regarding the definition
of finality in federal circuit court jurisdiction over bankruptcy appeals.
The confusing way Congress repealed § 1293 (the grant to federal circuit
courts of appellate jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters that preceded § 158) and
enacted § 158 is described in 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLEn, E. COOPER, & E. GRESS-
MAN, FEDERAL PPaCTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 3926, at 122-23 n.0.7 (Supp. 1990).
Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 also was unclear. For example, the Act did not repeal explicitly the stat-
ute permitting direct appeals to the circuit courts in bankruptcy matters, 28
U.S.C. § 1293(b) (1990). See Thistlethwaite v. First Nat'l Bank of Lafayette (In
re Exclusive Indus.), 751 F.2d 806, 807-08 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (attempting to rec-
oncile seemingly inconsistent amendments to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978).
The Supreme Court struck down the broad grant of jurisdiction to bank-
ruptcy courts under the 1978 Code in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1978) in Northern Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The Court
noted that Congress' authority to adjudicate state-created rights is de minimus,
and thus found 28 U.S.C. § 1471 unconstitutional because it permitted non-Ar-
ticle I tribunals to determine claims based totally on state law. Id. at 87.
11. See Towber, A Uniform Approach to Determining Finality in Bank-
ruptcy Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. Section 158(d), 29 S. TEx. L. REv. 587 (1988).
Towber states:
[No uniform approach (to finality analysis] has been enunciated in
these numerous cases rising to the appellate level .... Many of these
decisions fail to recognize that the adoption of traditional appellate re-
view in bankruptcy matters, modeled on the rules in regular civil liti-
gation which limit review to final orders, was a development
consistent with the broad jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy court
under the 1978 Code. However, when such legislation was restruc-
tured, the appellate review procedure was not altered appropri-
ately .... [U]nfortunately, by the time a party whose appeal is
dismissed suffers the irreparable harm which it seeks to redress in its
appeal, it is too late for that party to ever be made whole or be placed
into a status quo ante position.
The lack of a standard for determining finality undermines the
entire bankruptcy process. At a time when courts of appeals are in-
creasing their use of sanctions against a party who prosecutes a frivo-
lous appeal, the attorney who litigates regularly in bankruptcy
matters is often left without a clue as to what a circuit court of ap-
peals and what a particular panel within that circuit court will do
with an appeal.
Id. at 589-92 (footnotes omitted).
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This Note argues that all federal circuit courts should
adopt the pragmatic approach to interpreting finality used in
other legal contexts. Such an approach would avoid the une-
qual treatment caused by the present circuit split. Part I de-
scribes the evolution of flexible finality analysis used by federal
circuit courts when hearing appeals from district courts in non-
bankruptcy matters.'2 Part II examines the two dominant ap-
proaches circuit courts use in interpreting the section 158(d) fi-
nality requirement, and looks at a third, seldom-used approach.
Part III analyzes the weaknesses in the two dominant ap-
proaches used by the federal circuit courts. Part IV explains
how circuit courts could apply a more pragmatic balancing ap-
proach to interpreting finality. The Note concludes that circuit
courts should abandon the two dominant approaches, and adopt
a more pragmatic approach to interpreting the finality require-
ment of 28 U.S.C. section 158 (d).13
I. TRADITIONAL FINALITY ANALYSIS IN
NON-BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction is the first issue in all legal proceedings in fed-
eral courts. Without jurisdiction, a court is powerless to hear a
case on the merits. 14 Thus, before reaching the merits, federal
courts must satisfy themselves that they have jurisdiction to
hear a particular case.15
28 U.S.C. section 129116 gives federal circuit courts jurisdic-
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) grants federal circuit courts ju-
risdiction of appeals from final decisions in federal district courts in non-bank-
ruptcy matters. See infra note 16.
13. Adopting a pragmatic balancing approach to determine finality for
purposes of bankruptcy appeals would bring this area into line with finality
analysis in several non-bankruptcy contexts. See infra note 163.
14. Federal courts, unlike state courts, are courts of limited jurisdiction.
See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95
(1981). A federal court's jurisdiction is conferred either by an act of Congress
or by the United States Constitution. E- CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIC-
TION 147 (1989).
15. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 549 (1986)
(holding that a federal appellate court must satisfy itself not only of its own
jurisdiction but also that of the lower court under review); Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740 (1976) (holding that if a circuit court lacks ju-
risdiction because the district court's decision is not final, the Supreme Court
will refuse to review the circuit court's judgment); Allegheny Int'l Credit
Corp. v. Bowman, 821 F.2d 245, 246 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that every federal
appellate court must determine that jurisdiction is proper, even when the is-
sue is not raised by the parties on appeal).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) provides:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals
1340 [Vol. 74:1337
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tion over all final decisions of the federal district courts. 17 Sev-
eral important policies support the finality requirement. 18
Requiring finality underscores the trial judge's role as the ini-
tial person called on to decide the many issues of law and fact
that arise at trial.19 It conserves judicial resources by eliminat-
ing piecemeal appeals.20 The finality rule allows the appellate
court to determine issues on a full rather than a partial rec-
ord.2 1 The rule helps avoid the loss of evidence that might re-
for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all fi-
nal decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United
States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, The District
Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The juris-
diction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and
(d) and 1295 of this title.
Id.
17. The requirement that only final judgments are reviewable in federal
courts has its roots in the very beginnings of the federal judicial system.
Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 367 (3d. Cir. 1976). Section 22 of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that only final judgments, whether at law or in
equity, were reviewable. Federal Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84
(1789). See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSmAN, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3906, at 425-27 (1976 & Supp. 1990). Commenta-
tors have traced the limitation back to the English common law courts practice
of entertaining appeals solely from final dispositions of completed controver-
sies. See id. (discussing early English cases). For further discussion concern-
ing the historical development of the finality requirement, see Crick, The
Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 541-51 (1932).
18. Justice Frankfurter stressed the importance of the finality require-
ment for appellate jurisdiction in Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323
(1940):
Congress, from the very beginning has, by forbidding piecemeal dispo-
sition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy,
set itself against enfeebling judicial administration .... To be effec-
tive, judicial administration must not be leaden-footed. Its momen-
tum would be arrested by permitting separate reviews of the
component elements in a unified cause ....
IF]or purposes of appellate procedure, finality is not a
technical concept of temporal or physical termination. It
is the means for achieving a healthy legal system.
Id. at 325-26.
19. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
20. Id. The hostility toward piecemeal appeals is both logical and practi-
cal. Forbidding appeals from interlocutory judgments saves considerable time
and resources for both litigants and courts. If litigation is allowed to proceed,
a disputed ruling may lose its significance. A settlement may be reached or
the party aggrieved by the ruling ultimately might win the suit. See, e.g.,
Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1976).
21. See 9 J. MooRE, B. WARD & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACnCE
110.07 (2d ed. 1989).
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sult from a protracted trial.22 The final judgment rule also
helps preserve the court's and counsel's familiarity with a case,
which could be diminished due to repeated interruptions of the
trial court process. 23 Finally, the rule prevents a party with
substantial resources from harassing an opponent with endless
interlocutory appeals.24
Many courts traditionally define a final order as one that
ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.25 This definition makes
little sense when an order leaves nothing for the litigants to do,
yet technically there is no final judgment for the court to exe-
cute.26 For this reason, Congress and the courts developed
22. Id.
23. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 17,
§ 3907, at 431. Statutes of limitation are designed, in part, to prevent incorrect
adjudications, which may be more likely as the length of time increases be-
tween the occurrence of an event and the commencement of legal action. See,
e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). Analogously, incorrect
adjudications are more probable as the time lengthens between commence-
ment of a legal action and its final adjudication.
24. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 17,
§ 3907, at 432; see Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41
MINN. L. REv. 751, 780-82 (1957) (arguing that an injured person of limited
means may choose to settle for less than the amount awarded by the jury and
approved by the trial court rather than wait a year or more until an appellate
court affirms that the award was not excessive).
25. See, e.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (holding that
a final decision generally is one that ends the litigation on the merits, leaving
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment); St. Louis, Iron Moun-
tain & S. R.R. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28 (1883) (reasoning that a
decree is final, for purposes of appeal, when it terminates the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing to be done but enforcement of the decree); Cf Col-
lins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920) (holding that a judgment should be final
not only as to all the parties but as to the entire subject matter and all causes
of action involved).
Courts do not uniformly apply this finality requirement in non-bank-
ruptcy cases. See Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Fed-
eral Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89, 90 (1975) (arguing that strict adherence to
the final judgment rule would be absurd and in some cases could result in se-
vere hardship for the litigants).
26. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966).
Eisen brought a class action suit against dealers on the New York stock ex-
change charging violations of the federal antitrust laws. Id. at 119-20. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed
the class action suit but permitted Eisen to continue with his individual claim
for $70.00. Id. at 120. The Second Circuit held that Eisen could appeal this or-
der even though the district court did not decide the entire case. The circuit
court reasoned that Eisen's personal claim was so small that no lawyer would
take his case absent a class action. Thus, if the appeal were dismissed, not
only would Eisen's claim never be adjudicated, but no appellate court would
have the chance to decide the propriety of a class action. Id.
1342 [Vol. 74:1337
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pragmatic exceptions to the finality requirement in non-bank-
ruptcy appeals. Statutory exceptions to the finality require-
ment include 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b) 2 7 and Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2s Judicially created excep-
tions to the finality requirement first appeared in Forgay v.
Conrad,29 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,30 and Gil-
lespie v. United States Steel Corp.31
Gillespie is the most prominent Supreme Court case man-
dating a broader, more pragmatic approach to interpreting fi-
nality.32 In Gillespie, a parent brought a wrongful death action
on behalf of herself and the decedent's brothers and sisters af-
ter her son was killed while working on the defendant's ship
27. Section 1292(b) allows appeals from a civil action if a district court cer-
tifies that it "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) allows an appeal to a federal circuit court when a
federal district judge certifies orders that are final as to only certain parties or
certain issues in complex litigation.
29. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848). In Forgay, the circuit court, without issu-
ing a final decree, ordered that certain lands and slaves be delivered to a credi-
tor in bankruptcy. Id. at 203. The Supreme Court refused to give the finality
requirement a strict, technical reading. Id. The Court heard the case on the
merits, reasoning that if the appellants were forced to wait for a more final
order of the circuit court, the land and slaves they claimed would be taken
from their possession, sold, and the profits distributed before they had oppor-
tunity to appeal. The "Forgay doctrine" allows immediate appeal when the
substantive issues have been determined and delay of the appeal would render
the appeal of little value to the appellant because he or she "may be ruined
before he is permitted to avail himself of the right." Id. at 205. See 9 J.
MOORE, B. WARD, J. LucAs, supra note 21, 110.11, at 86-105 (discussing the
development of the Forgay doctrine).
30. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The exception from Cohen also is termed the col-
lateral order rule. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir.
1966). In Cohen, the Supreme Court heard an appeal from a Third Circuit or-
der denying a corporation's motion that would have required the plaintiff in a
stockholder's derivative suit to give security for reasonable legal expenses of
the defendant. Id. at 543. The Court found it significant that the order was
not a step toward the final disposition of the case on the merits and would not
form part of the final judgment. To qualify for the Cohen exception to the fi-
nal order rule, the ruling conclusively must determine a disputed question,
must resolve an important issue that is completely severable from the action,
and must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment. Id.
at 546.
31. 379 U.S. 148 (1964). The Gillespie exception allows review from a non-
final order if the appeal presents a question that is fundamental to the further
conduct of the case. Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc. v. Industrial Dev. Bd. of
Huntsville (In re Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc.), 796 F.2d 1435, 1437 (11th Cir.
1986).
32. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
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docked in Ohio.3 3 She claimed a right to recover under the
Jones Act, for unseaworthiness under general maritime laws,
and under Ohio's wrongful death statute.3 The Gillespie Court
directed courts to interpret finality pragmatically and to decide
close questions in favor of appealability, while permitting ap-
peal of several interim orders. The Supreme Court held that
the district court's granting of a motion to strike, thereby con-
fining the complaint to the Jones Act and eliminating recovery
by the siblings, was a final order for purposes of 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1291.36
The Gillespie Court emphasized that the question of final-
ity under section 1291 is frequently so close a call that a deci-
sion either way may be supported by forceful arguments. 37
Justice Black reasoned that it was impossible to derive a
formula to resolve all marginal cases falling within the "twi-
light zone" of finality.38 Therefore, courts should give the gen-
eral finality requirement of section 1291 "a practical rather
than a technical construction." 39
The Gillespie court did not rely on any previous definition
of finality, holding instead that the district court's order was fi-
nal because the danger of denying justice to the plaintiffs was
greater than the inconvenience of piecemeal litigation.40 The
Court encouraged circuit courts to find finality whenever the
dangers of denying justice by delay appear to outweigh the in-
convenience of piecemeal litigation.4 '
Some commentators predicted that Gillespie might alter
profoundly the interpretation of the finality requirement of
section 1291 and lead to much broader appellate jurisdiction for
circuit courts.42 Some commentators advocated such a result.43
33. Id. at 150.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 152-54.
36. Id. at 152.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949)).
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id. at 152 (citing Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S.
507, 511 (1950)).
42. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTS, § 101, at 511 (2d
ed. 1970).
43. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 17,
§ 3905, at 424-25. Wright, Miller, Cooper, and Gressman argue that when the
parties and trial court have assumed that an appeal is proper, the primary jus-
tification for the final judgment rule is a desire to ensure that future parties
1344 [Vol. 74:1337
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These predictions, however, did not come true. Instead, subse-
quent lower court decisions have either interpreted Gillespie
restrictively" or ignored it altogether and returned to earlier,
more restrictive notions of finality.45
II. FINALITY ANALYSIS IN BANKRUPTCY APPEALS
A. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO FINALITY IN BANKRUPTCY
APPEALS
Federal statutes confer federal appellate court jurisdiction
in the bankruptcy area.46 The original Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
as amended in 1938,47 granted the district courts appellate juris-
diction over orders, decrees, or judgments, whether interlocu-
tory or final, that were entered in proceedings before federal
bankruptcy courts. The Act gave federal circuit courts jurisdic-
tion only over final orders from the district court in controver-
sies arising out of bankruptcy.48
consider carefully questions of appellate jurisdiction. When there is no clear
answer to that question, they argue that the Gillespie approach would allow a
court to hear an appeal and then announce whether similar cases would be ap-
pealable in the future. Id.
44. See, eg., New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d
183, 185 (1st Cir. 1972) (noting that Gillespie stands only for the proposition
that an order may be considered final, although entered in proceedings still
pending before a court, if immediate review of the order would settle issues
fundamental to the further conduct of the case).
45. See Bradley v. Milliken, 468 F.2d 902, 902-03 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that an order requiring the parties
to submit proposed plans for desegregation of the Detroit schools within a stip-
ulated period of time was not a final order for purposes of appeal).
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) (granting federal circuit court jurisdiction
over bankruptcy).
47. Section 24 of the Bankruptcy Act, provided:
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURTS a. the Circuit Courts of Appeals
of the United States and the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in vacation, in chambers, and during their re-
spective terms, as now or as they may hereafter be held, are hereby
invested with appellate jurisdiction from the several courts of bank-
ruptcy in their respective jurisdictions in proceedings in bankruptcy,
either interlocutory or final, and in controversies arising in proceed-
ings in bankruptcy, to review, affirm, revise, or reverse, both in mat-
ters of law and in matters of fact; Provided, however, that the
jurisdiction on appeal from a judgment on a verdict rendered by a
jury, shall extend to matters of law only Providedfurther, that when
any order, decree, or judgment involves less than $500, an appeal
therefrom may be taken only upon allowance of the appellate court.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1898) (repealed 1978).
48. Chicago Bank of Commerce v. Carter, 61 F.2d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 1932)
("Controversies [are] those matters arising in the course of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding which are not mere steps in the administration of the estate, but
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197849 overhauled the en-
tire appellate process for bankruptcy cases. The very broad
grant of jurisdiction found in the Act was replaced with 28
U.S.C. section 1293(b), which narrowed the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts of appeal to "a final judgment, order, or decree" in
bankruptcy.50  The circuits split on whether to interpret the fi-
nality requirement for bankruptcy appeals in the same manner
in which they interpret the finality requirement of non-bank-
ruptcy appeals.51
Because Congress drafted section 1293 under severe time
constraints, the section suffered numerous flaws.52  Many
which give rise to distinct and separable issues between the trustee[s] and ad-
verse claimants, concerning the right and title to the bankrupt's estate.")
49. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1980).
50. The revamped appeal procedures of the Bankruptcy Reform Act were
not to become effective until April 1, 1984. During a four-and-one-half year
transition period, however, most of the amendments to the judicial code, in-
cluding those relating to appeals, were to apply to the existing bankruptcy
courts. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
51. Several courts have held they are not bound by the traditional finality
analysis developed under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the statute granting federal circuit
courts appellate jurisdiction in non-bankruptcy matters, when they interpret
28 U.S.C. § 1293, the statute granting federal circuit courts appellate jurisdic-
tion in bankruptcy. Rather, these courts hold that they are free to apply a
more flexible interpretation of finality. In Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A.
Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1981), the court did not consider on appeal
whether the district court's decision was final within the meaning of § 1291,
because it construed the 1978 amendments as providing a "comprehensive...
schema for jurisdiction of bankruptcy appeals." Id. at 101 n.3. Other courts
have looked to finality analysis developed under § 1291 as a guide to interpret-
ing the finality requirement in bankruptcy. See Wisz v. Moister, 778 F.2d 762,
764 (11th Cir. 1985) ("In determining what is a final order in a bankruptcy ap-
peal this court consistently has applied the final order jurisprudence devel-
oped under 28 U.S.C. § 1291"); International Horizons, Inc. v. Committee of
Unsecured Creditors, 689 F.2d 996, 1000 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that "in
determining whether we are presented with a final and appealable order for
the purposes [of § 1293], we shall look to the extensive final order jurispru-
dence that has developed in the context of appeals brought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291"); Stewart v. Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107, 1110-12 (5th Cir. 1981) (for purpose
of bankruptcy appeals, the Fifth Circuit will look to finality analysis developed
in the context of § 1291 non-bankruptcy appeals). In Sambo's Restaurants,
Inc. v. Wheeler, Inc., 754 F.2d 811, 813 (9th Cir. 1985), the court warned against
blind adherence to § 1291 finality jurisprudence, but acknowledged that the
court generally is guided by the finality analysis under § 1291 even though
§ 1293 freed the court to develop new principles to fit the special needs of
bankruptcy administration.
52. See Maiorino v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1982)
("[Tihe working of the statute [§ 1293] is complicated, a situation doubtless en-
gendered because the appeals provisions of the Act were hastily drawn during
an eleventh hour compromise... that produced the present jumble as well as
apparently inadvertent inconsistencies in the statute.").
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judges criticized these flaws. 53 In 1984, Congress responded to
the criticism and replaced section 1293 with section 158.54
Due to the similarity of their language, circuit courts rou-
tinely look to decisions interpreting section 1293(b) as a guide
in construing the finality requirement of section 158(d).s1 Pres-
ently, section 158 provides for initial appellate review of bank-
ruptcy court decisions by the federal district court or by a
bankruptcy appellate panel.sa Subsequent review of final judg-
53. See, e.g., Moxley v. Comer, 716 F.2d 168, 173 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1983)
("[R]esolution of the differing Senate and House bankruptcy bills by the floor
managers resulted in some ambiguity in the appellate jurisdiction intended by
Congress in its drafting of section 1293 .... An authoritative commentary de-
scribes the appeal provisions as 'nearly incomprehensible,' leaving appeals
from the district courts 'in a sorry state of uncertainty.' ") (quoting 16 C.
WRIGHT, A. Amm, F. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 3926, at 39 (Supp. 1982); Belo Broadcasting v. Rubin, 693 F.2d 73, 76
(9th Cir. 1982) ("Standard principles of statutory construction are not of sub-
stantial assistance since it is not possible to read § 1293(a) and (b) to be inter-
nally consistent with other provisions of the act while at the same time
interpreting the language in a way to give each a meaning.").
54. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988) provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
hear appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees, and, with
leave of the court, from interlocutory orders and decrees, of bank-
ruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bank-
ruptcy judges under section 157 of this title. An appeal under this
subsection shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial dis-
trict in which the bankruptcy judge is serving.
Id.
55. See Pizza of Hawaii, Inc. v. Shakey's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1374, 1378 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1985) (holding that decisions regarding finality under § 1293 are control-
ling under § 158). One leading commentator has argued that the same liberal-
ity in interpretation should obtain under section 158(d) as was used in
interpreting section 1293. 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESS-
MAX, supra note 10, § 3926, at 112 ('"e special needs of complex, multiparty
bankruptcy administration have long justified distinctive rules for timing ap-
peals, and there is no justification for suddenly scrapping the long experience
under earlier statutes .... The decisions under the 1978 legislation reflected
these concerns, and supply some guidance for applying the 1984 legislation").
56. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1988) provides:
(1) The judicial council of a circuit may establish a bankruptcy appel-
late panel, comprised of bankruptcy judges from districts within the
circuit, to hear and determine, upon the consent of all the parties, ap-
peals under subsection (a) of this section.
(2) No appeal may be referred to a panel under this subsection unless
the district judges for the district, by majority vote, authorize such re-
ferral of appeals originating within the district.
(3) A panel established under this section shall consist of three bank-
ruptcy judges, provided a bankruptcy judge may not hear an appeal
originating within a district for which the judge is appointed or desig-
nated under section 152 of this title.
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ments, orders, and decrees is available in the circuit court of ap-
peals for that jurisdiction. 57
Finality does not mean the same thing in bankruptcy cases
as it means in other federal cases. It would not be feasible to
postpone all appeals until the end of the bankruptcy case be-
cause most bankruptcy cases are too large and complex.58
Within a single bankruptcy case there may be several claims
that would form separate lawsuits in any other context.5 9 A
bankruptcy court, however, can enter a truly final disposition
of an estate only after defining each of the creditors' claims and
filing the order closing the case.60 A large bankruptcy case can
continue for many years after a court determines an individual
creditor's claim.6 ' Forcing that creditor to wait until the entire
proceeding ends could mean a wait of several years.62 Courts
28 U.S.C. § 158(b) succeeded 28 U.S.C. § 160, which also authorized the judicial
council of a circuit to establish appellate panels, each consisting of three bank-
ruptcy judges. Unlike the previous law, an appeal may not be referred to a
panel unless a majority of the district judges for the district vote to authorize
such referral and the parties consent. Only the Ninth Judicial Council has au-
thorized creation of an appellate panel. See Bermant & Sloan, Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's Eaperience, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181, 184-86
(1989). The First Circuit Judicial Council briefly experimented with bank-
ruptcy appellate panels. See id. at 187-90.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. V 1987) provides:
The circuits shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions,
judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b)
of this section.
The circuits disagree about whether § 158(d) is the only basis for appellatejurisdiction over bankruptcy matters. Some circuits hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
the general grant of appellate jurisdiction to federal circuit courts, see supra
notes 16-17 and accompanying text, also grants appellate jurisdiction over
bankruptcy matters. See, e.g., Teton Exploration Drilling v. Bokum Resources
Corp., 818 F.2d 1521, 1524 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987) (arguing that § 158(d) does not
preclude general appellate jurisdiction of appellate courts under § 1291). A
contrary line of cases holds that § 158 is the exclusive basis for appellate juris-
diction, therefore superseding § 1291. See, e.g., Teleport Oil Co. v. Security
Pac. Nat'l Bank, 759 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1985).
58. 2 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy, 1124.04, at 717 n.34 (J. Moore
14th ed. 1976).
59. See Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc. v. Industrial Dev. Bd. of Huntsville
(In re Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc.), 796 F.2d 1435, 1437 (11th Cir. 1986)
(stating that "[v]iewed realistically, a bankruptcy case i simply an aggregation
of controversies, many of which would constitute individual lawsuits had a
bankruptcy petition never been filed").
60. See Mason v. Integrity Ins. Co. (In re Mason) 709 F.2d 1313, 1316 (9th
Cir. 1983) (stating that "the only truly final order in a bankruptcy proceeding
occurs when the order closing the case is filed").





thus frequently interpret finality analysis more broadly in
bankruptcy cases.6 The traditional rule is that a proceeding to
establish a claim against a debtor's estate may be considered fi-
nal when it is defined, even though the bankruptcy case
continues."
When a bankruptcy court issues a final order that the fed-
eral district court reverses and remands for further proceed-
ings, the circuits disagree about whether the section 158(d)
finality requirement should be measured by the final order of
the bankruptcy court or by the district court's reversal and re-
mand.6s If the federal circuit court focuses on the final order of
the bankruptcy court, the circuit court has a final order to re-
view. If the federal circuit court ignores the final order of the
bankruptcy court and focuses on the federal district court's re-
versal with remand for further proceedings, the circuit court
may not have a final order to review. Searching section 158 leg-
islative history for the solution to interpreting its grant of juris-
diction is futile. Representative Kastenmeier, the sponsor of
the language, saw it only as continuing "traditional appellate
review."6
B. TWO CURRENT APPROACHES To FINALTY ANALYSIS USED
BY CIRCUIT COURTS
Before a bankruptcy case reaches a federal circuit court,
the matter passes through a bankruptcy court and, on review,
goes to a federal district court.67 A minority of jurisdictions
63. See, e.g., Moxley v. Comer (In re Comer), 716 F.2d 168, 171 (3d Cir.
1983) (concluding that considerations unique to bankruptcy permit the court to
interpret finality more broadly than in a non-bankruptcy context); see also In
re Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 758 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that "the
difference, if any, between finality under section 1291 [for non-bankruptcy
matters] and finality under section 1293(b) [for bankruptcy matters] stems
from the unique nature of bankruptcy cases. This uniqueness may, in certain
cases, justify a more liberal reading of finality under section 1293(b)"); In re
Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that finality
decisions in bankruptcy are different from bankruptcy decisions in other
contexts).
64. See, eg., In re Fox, 762 F.2d 54, 55 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that a deci-
sion is final for purposes of appeal if all that remains is purely mechanical or
computational).
65. "[D]ifficult questions arise when the district court, hearing an appeal
from a final order of the bankruptcy court, remands to that court for further
action. There are both intra-circuit and inter-circuit disputes on this issue,
leaving it hopelessly unresolved." 1 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3.03[b] (L. King ed. 1987)(footnotes omitted).
66. 130 CONG. REC. E1108 (daily ed. March 20, 1984).
67. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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hold that if a bankruptcy court's decision is final, a district
court's reversal of that decision with remand for further pro-
ceedings also is final.68 This broad approach ignores the further
proceedings ordered by the federal district court and focuses on
the bankruptcy court's final order when interpreting the final-
ity requirement of 28 U.S.C. section 158(d). These courts rea-
son that, because the bankruptcy court's order is final, the
federal district court's order should be considered final for pur-
poses of appeal to the circuit court.69 Circuits using this ap-
proach frequently cite the Third Circuit's opinion in In re
Matin Motor Oil, Inc. v. Michaes.70 Matin held that a federal
district court order affirming or reversing a final order of the
bankruptcy court also is a final order within the meaning of
section 158(d).71
The Matin court provided a number of reasons for its posi-
68. Namely, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Sambo's Res-
taurants, Inc. v. Wheeler, 754 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1985); Bayer v. Nicola (In re
Bestmann), 720 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1983); Matin Motor Oil, Inc. v. Michaels, 689
F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1982).
69. See, e.g., Matin, 689 F.2d at 449 (holding that when a bankruptcy court
issues a final order and the federal district court reverses and remands for fur-
ther proceedings, the district court's order also is a final order for purposes of
appeal).
70. 689 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1982).
71. Id. at 449. Matin is often cited for its rigid holding, but the Matin
court found it significant that a reversal of the district court's judgment in the
case would preclude any further litigation by the plaintiff. Id. at 448. This
concern for the effect of its ruling makes the Matin holding appear much
more flexible.
In Moxley v. Comer (In re Comer), 716 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1983), the Third
Circuit implied that its own precedent, Marin, which focused on the action of
the bankruptcy court and allowed an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision
that was reversed and remanded by the district court, was not intended to be
the exclusive test. Id. at 172-73. Rather, the court found the Matin approach
simply another argument for its position. Id. Indeed, the court suggested the
best approach was a pragmatic approach that looks at the effect of the district
court's ruling. Id. at 172.
In In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985), the Third Circuit ex-
panded its Marin analysis and argued that, in addition to determining whether
there was anything more for the federal district court to do, the circuit court
should consider "the practical effect of the ... order at issue." Id. at 1040.
Most recently, in Southeastern Sprinkler Co., Inc. v. Meyertech Corp. (In re
Meyertech Corp.), 831 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1987), the Third Circuit reasoned that
finality, for purposes of appeal in bankruptcy from district court to circuit
court, should be determined by a desire to reach a practical termination of the
case in issue. Id. at 414. Factors to weigh in that determination are the impact
on the assets of the debtor's estate, the necessity of further factfinding on re-
mand to the bankruptcy court, the preclusive effect of the decision on the
merits for further litigation, and a concern for judicial economy. I&L
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tion.72 The court reasoned that, when a district court affirms or
reverses a final order of a bankruptcy court, the district court
judgment is final because nothing remains for the district court
to do.1 3 In addition, the Mann court found that the court of ap-
peals and the district court play identical roles in bankruptcy
appeals because both the district and the circuit court must ex-
amine the propriety of the bankruptcy court's decision.74 The
circuit court, therefore, can review the bankruptcy court's find-
ing as competently as the district court.75 The Matin court
also noted that one of the primary reasons courts sometimes
narrowly construe the finality requirement is a desire to re-
spect the unique roles of the trial court and the appellate
court.76 This objective is inapposite, the Marin court claimed,
when the court of appeals is asked to review a district court act-
ing as a lower appellate court.77
The Manin court also held that, because the relatively lib-
eral appeals rules under the old Bankruptcy Act provisions78
were not unduly burdensome, courts need not be overly con-
cerned that interpreting finality broadly in appeals under sec-
72. The court began its analysis by pointing out that it was not bound by
traditional finality analysis developed under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for non-bank-
ruptcy appeals, because 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) provided a "comprehensive and ex-
clusive schema for jurisdiction of bankruptcy appeals." Marin, 689 F.2d at 447
(quoting Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101 n.3
(3d Cir. 1981); see supra note 59 (discussing different approaches courts use in
interpreting § 158 in light of § 1291).
73. Marin, 689 F.2d at 448 (quoting Universal Minerals, 669 F.2d at 101).
The fact that a particular matter will not require further adjudication in the
district court can not be the only consideration. See Moxley, 716 F.2d at 172
(arguing that a purely interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court, enter-
tained by leave of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), would be final
because the district court's work is finished, but the order would not be final
under § 158(d)).
74. The Matin court argued that when the district court reviews a final
order of the bankruptcy court, and the court of appeals then reviews the dis-
trict court's determination with respect to the bankruptcy court's final order,
the court of appeals is in essence reviewing a final order of the bankruptcy
court, even though it might be necessary to examine the district court's analy-
sis as well as that of the bankruptcy court. Matin, 689 F.2d at 448.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 449 (quoting 15 C. WIGHT, A. MILER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PRocEDuRE § 3907 (1976)).
77. Id. Because the United States bankruptcy system uses a four-level
court system, the Matin court correctly referred to the district court as a
"lower appellate court." i
78. Former 11 U.S.C. § 47(a) (1898) (repealed 1978) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 158). See supra notes 46-47. For an entertaining examination of the
evolution of this statute into 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), see In re Greene County
Hosp., 835 F.2d 589, 591-96 (5th Cir. 1988).
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tion 1293(b) will cause undue problems.79 One object of the
finality rule is to save time by avoiding unnecessary appeals
and delays.8 0 The Matin court held that the delay factor is less
compelling when the bankruptcy decision is final rather than
interlocutory.8 1
Two circuits continue to follow the Mann approach. In
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. Wheeler, 2 the Ninth Circuit em-
braced the reasoning of the Main court.83 Sambo's held that
when a bankruptcy court's order is final and results in a non-
final district court order on review, the district court order is
appealable if nothing remains for the district court to do.84 The
Sambo's court, however, went further than Manin, and stated
its belief that this approach to determining finality will be the
most efficient.85 The court found that, although bankruptcy
courts still would be required to conduct full adversary pro-
ceedings on remand from some of the district court appeals, liti-
gation would be completed if the circuit court reversed the
district court decision.86
The Eighth Circuit also adopted the Matin approach to in-
79. Marin, 689 F.2d at 449. Section 1293 is the predecessor of § 158(a).
Some courts routinely look to decisions interpreting § 1293(b) to guide them in
interpreting § 158(d). See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
80. Matin, 689 F.2d at 449 (quoting 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 3907 (1976)).
81. The Main court recognized that its approach may result in two ap-
peals of a case, one from the disputed remand order, and the other from
whatever order the district court enters on appeal from the bankruptcy court's
final decision following remand. Id. at 448. The court argued that although
two appeals might delay a trial more than one appeal, any damage to a speedy
and coherent trial is caused primarily by the initial appeal. Id. at 449. Indeed,
in some instances two appeals may be no more time consuming than a single
appeal. In Matin, the adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court appar-
ently continued unaffected by the circuit court appeal. Id. at 449 n.2.
82. 754 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 814.
84. Id.
85. Id. The court noted:
Because we believe this approach is virtually always more efficient in
reviewing a district court's review of a final bankruptcy court judg-
ment, we conclude it is not necessary to examine the relative costs of
immediate versus delayed review of these types of district court or-
ders on a case-by-case basis.
Id.
86. Id In Crevier v. Welfare & Pension Fund for Local 701 (In re
Crevier), 820 F.2d 1553 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit diluted its holding in
Sambo's. The Crevier court held that a non-final order of a district court re-
versing a final order of a bankruptcy court is appealable unless the intermedi-
ate court remands for factual development. Id. at 1555.
1352 [Vol. 74:1337
BANKRUPTCY APPEALS
terpreting finality in Bayer v. Nicola (In re Bestmann).7 The
underlying dispute in Bestmann was over the ownership of cer-
tain hogs.88 Appellant filed an adversary proceeding in the
bankruptcy court claiming that proceeds from the sale of the
hogs belonged to him and not the defendant bank, which had a
security interest in the property of the debtor.8 9 The bank-
ruptcy court found the debtor did own the hogs and awarded
the proceeds to the bank.9 0 On appeal, the district court held
that the appeal was interlocutory and dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction.9 1 The Eighth Circuit found the district
court's dismissal of the case was a final order for purposes of
appeal.92
A second and more flexible approach to determining final-
ity focuses on what remains to be done by the bankruptcy court
after remand from the district court. Courts following this ap-
proach refuse to hear bankruptcy appeals from a district court
when the district court remands a case to the bankruptcy court
for significant further proceedings 9 3
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Suburban Bank v. Rigg-
sby exemplifies this approach.9 4 The Riggsby court directly
87. Bayer v. Nicola (In re Bestmann), 720 F.2d 484, at 486-87 (8th Cir.
1983).




92. Id. at 486. Bestmann is often cited for its rigid Marin-like approach.
See Homa Ltd. v. Stone (In re Matter of Commercial Contractors), 771 F.2d
1373, 1375 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing Bestmann in support of a Matin approach to
finality); 1 W. COLiER, supra note 67, 3.03[6][b], at 3-192 & n.77 (citing
Bestmann for the proposition that when the bankruptcy court issues a final
order and the district court affirms or reverses, the district court's order also is
final).
The Bestmann court, however, found it significant that denial of the ap-
peal would preclude litigation on the issue of the district court's jurisdiction.
Bestmann, 720 F.2d at 486. Such concern for the likely effect of the court's
finality decision makes the Bestmann approach far less rigid than the holding
for which it is frequently cited. This concern moves the court's approach
closer to the pragmatic approach used in other contexts to determine finality.
See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
93. The First, Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. The
Eighth Circuit has used this approach once. See First Nat. Bank of Tekamah,
Nebraska v. Hansen (In re Hansen), 702 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (holding that "district court orders of remand are not final appealable
orders"). But see Bestmann, 720 F.2d at 486 (adopting the Manin approach to
interpreting finality, which holds that a district court's order in bankruptcy is
final if it leaves nothing more for the district court to do).
94. 745 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that "a decision of the district
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challenged the efficiency argument made in Sambo's,9 5 ruling
that it is more efficient to wait until remand to bankruptcy
court is completed before the circuit court hears an appeal.9
The Riggsby court analogized remand from a district court to a
bankruptcy court to remand from a district court to an adminis-
trative agency.97 The Riggsby court maintained that an order
by a district court remanding an administrative appeal for fur-
ther proceedings before the agency is not considered a final or-
der.9 8 The court also analogized a remand to bankruptcy court
to the traditional interpretation of 28 U.S.C. section 1257 that
holds that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction of state court deci-
sions does not include remands from a higher to a lower state
court.99  A number of jurisdictions follow the Riggsby
approach.10°
court on appeal from a bankruptcy judge's final order is not itself final if the
decision remands the case to the bankruptcy judge for significant further pro-
ceedings"); see also In re Fox, 762 F.2d 54, 55 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding a district
court order final if "all that remains to do on remand is a purely mechanical,
computational, or in short 'ministerial' task, whose performance is unlikely to
generate a new appeal or to affect the issue that the disappointed party wants
to raise on appeal from the order of remand").
95. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing Sambo's).
96. Rggsby, 745 F.2d at 1155-56. The court wrote that:
Because most proceedings before bankruptcy judges are summary, re-
mands usually take little time to complete and it is therefore more ef-
ficient to wait until the bankruptcy judge is finished with the case...
before bringing up the case to the court of appeals. If a district judge
remanded a case for further proceedings that would take a week to
complete, and the remand order was appealable and was upheld on
appeal, a year or more might elapse before the proceedings on remand
were concluded. Yet if those proceedings had been conducted without
this interruption, then, depending on their outcome, there might be
no appeal at all, and in any event there would be no chance of two
appeals - one from the order of remand and the other from
whatever order the district judge entered on appeal from the bank-
ruptcy judge's final decision following remand.
Id. (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 1156.
98. "Provided that the order is effectively reviewable on appeal from the
agency's (here the bankruptcy court's) final decision." Id. at 1156 (citing
United Steelworkers v. Union IR., 648 F.2d 905, 910-11 (3d Cir. 1981)).
99. See id. The Riggsby court was reluctant to press this analogy too hard
because of the "additional considerations" involved in this analysis. Id. Other
courts also have been reluctant to press the analogy. See, e.g., Universal Min-
erals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1981)(expressing re-
luctance to analogize remands in bankruptcy to remands from a higher to a
lower state court due to "institutional considerations" and the greater impor-
tance of the final judgment rule in the context of the review of state court
judgments).
100. In re Gould & Eberhardt Gear & Mach. Corp., 852 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.
1988). In Gould, the First Circuit held that "when a district court remands a
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C. A HYBRID OF THE CURRENT APPROACHES TO FINALITY
A seldom used approach to determining finality is a hybrid
of the rigid Mann approach and the flexible Riggsby approach.
This pragmatic approach focuses on the likely effect the district
matter to the bankruptcy courtfor significant further proceedings, there is no
final order for the purposes of § 158(d) and therefore the court of appeals
lacks jurisdiction." Id. at 29 (emphasis added). However, "[w]hen a remand
leaves only ministerial proceedings, for example, computation of amounts ac-
cording to established formulae, the remand may be considered final." Id.
The Second Circuit agreed with Riggsby in LTV Corp. v. Farragher (In re
Chateaugay Corp.), 838 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1988). The court held that it lacked
jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court order vacating and remanding
a bankruptcy court order because the district court's order was "replete with
expressions of non-finality, contemplat[ed] significant further proceedings...
and anticipat[ed] modification of injunctive relief upon the presentation of ad-
ditional evidence to the bankruptcy court." Id. at 62.
The Fifth Circuit was faced with an appeal from a district court order re-
manding the case to the bankruptcy court for an accounting and further pro-
ceedings in County Management, Inc. v. Kriegel, 788 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1986).
The court held that the remand for further factual proceedings was not a final
order. Id. at 313. The court, in dicta, went even further than Riggsby. The
court reasoned that, even if the district court had merely remanded for an ac-
counting without requiring resolution of further factual and legal issues, its or-
der would not have been final because the general approach to interpreting
finality under § 1291 is that "an order determining the rights and liabilities of
the parties and remanding for an accounting is interlocutory." Id. at 314. The
Fifth Circuit subsequently modified this rigid position. See ITT Diversified
Credit Corp. v. Lift & Equip. Serv., Inc., 816 F.2d 1013, 1016 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding order final when nothing more than the bankruptcy court's review of
the scheduled expenses was required.)
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an
appeal of a district court order remanding the case to the bankruptcy judge to
conduct an adversary hearing in TCL Investors v. Brookside Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 775 F.2d 1516, 1519 (11th Cir. 1985).
The Tenth Circuit followed the flexible Riggsby approach in determining
finality in Hama Ltd. v. Stone (In re Commercial Contractors), 771 F.2d 1373,
1375 (10th Cir. 1985). The court found that the more traditional view of final-
ity set out in Riggsby "furthers the policy underlying the finality doctrine by
controlling piecemeal adjudication and eliminating the delays caused by the
appeal of interlocutory decisions." Id.
The Ninth Circuit, contrary to the rigid position it would later take in
Sambo's, see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text, held it did not have ju-
risdiction over a bankruptcy appeal in view of the remand for factual determi-
nation by the bankruptcy judge. Dental Capital Leasing v. Martinez, 721 F.2d
262, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit purported to reconcile Sambo's
with Martinez in King v. Stanton, 766 F.2d 1283, 1287 n.7 (9th Cir. 1985):
One case, In re Riggsby suggests that the rule we adopted in Sambo's
is inconsistent with our earlier holding in Mainez .... The Seventh
Circuit concluded and apparently interpreted Martinez to mean, that
a district court's order is not final if it remands the case to bankruptcy
court 'for significant further proceedings'. Recently, in In re Four
Seas Center, Ltd., our court described the holding in Martinez simi-
larly, stating in dicta that we lack appellate jurisdiction '[w]hen fur-
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court's decision will have on the case.101 The Sixth Circuit used
this approach in In re Gardner.0 2 In Gardner, the circuit court
faced an appeal from a district court order reversing a bank-
ruptcy court order concerning the existence of insurance cover-
age. 0 3 The district court had remanded the case to the
bankruptcy court to determine whether a release signed by the
appellants was fraudulent.0 4 The circuit court examined the
underlying support for both the Sambo's approach, which fol-
lowed Matin,10 5 and the Riggsby approach.'06 The Gardner
court then applied the reasoning of each of these two ap-
proaches to the particular facts of the case before it. 0 7
ther proceedings in the bankruptcy court will affect the scope of the
order.'
If Martinez were read as the Seventh Circuit suggested in Rigg-
sby or if our statement in Four Seas were taken literally, perhaps
Martinez and Sambo's would be inconsistent with one another. An
outright reversal and remand by the BAP ordinarily will fall within
the Samba's rule, even though it would entail 'further proceedings'
that likely would affect the scope of the bankruptcy court's order.
But we conclude that Martinez cannot be read as broadly as Riggsby
or Four Seas might suggest. The key to our holding in Martinez was
that the BAP remanded for further factual findings.
Id. (citations omitted).
Arguably, this attenuated reasoning constitutes a substantial retreat from
Samba's.
101. See infra note 110.
102. Breyfogle v. Grange Mut. Casualty Co. (In re Gardner), 810 F.2d 87
(6th Cir. 1987).
103. Id. at 88. The bankruptcy court held as a matter of law that no insur-
ance coverage existed for plaintiffs. Id. The district court reversed, holding, as
a matter of law, that insurance coverage existed. Id. at 90.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 91. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing
Samba's).
106. Gardner, 810 F.2d at 92.
107. Id. at 92. In Gardner, the bankruptcy court held the defendant insur-
ance company not liable to a trustee in bankruptcy for damages that resulted
from a car accident because, as a matter of law, no insurance coverage existed.
Id. The district court reversed the holding of the bankruptcy court and held
that insurance coverage did exist. Id. at 90. The district court also remanded
for a determination whether releases signed by two persons were fraudulent
to another person and to the trustee in bankruptcy. Id. On remand, the bank-
ruptcy court was to determine whether one party received fair value in ex-
change for a release to the defendant signed by him, and whether he executed
the release knowing or believing he would be unable to pay his debts when
they became due. Id.
The federal circuit court believed existence of insurance coverage was the
central determinative issue. Id. at 92. If the circuit court agreed with the
bankruptcy court that no insurance coverage existed the case would end and
the bankruptcy court would not have to hold the further proceedings ordered
by the federal district court. Id. The Gardner court believed that the issue of
whether insurance coverage existed was straightforward. The facts were un-
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Gardner exemplifies a result-oriented approach to finality
analysis. 08 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the legal issue con-
cerning the existence of insurance was the determinative issue
underlying the dispute.109 If the circuit court agreed with the
bankruptcy court that no coverage existed, the entire case
would end and a remand would be unnecessary.n The Sixth
Circuit held that, under these circumstances, the Riggsby line
of cases was not controlling and the reasoning of Sambo's was
more persuasive."' The court explicitly declined, however, to
adopt the rule developed in Mann and extended in Sambo's.m2
Gardner might have profoundly altered the interpretation
of the finality requirement for bankruptcy appeals had other
courts followed the Gardner court's lead. Although other
courts appear concerned with the likely result of their rul-
ing,"3 they typically do not adopt the Gardner approach." 4
Unfortunately, as happened with the Gillpie approach," 5
many subsequent decisions ignore it altogether, and return to
earlier, more restrictive notions of finality.n 6
disputed and no further factfinding would be necessary. Id. The court rea-
soned that the Sambo's approach, see supra notes 85-89 and accompanying
text, was most appropriate to the case before it. Gardner, 810 F.2d at 92.
108. See supra note 110.
109. Gardner, 810 F.2d at 92.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The court did not fully adopt the Sambo's approach, presumably be-
cause it preferred a more pragmatic approach that allows the court to apply
the Riggsby and Sambo's approaches merely as guidelines and then to examine
the effect of the finality decision upon each case. See id. at 92 n.3.
113. For example, Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d
98 (3d Cir. 1981) (relied on in Marin), treated a judgment as final because
nothing remained for the district court to do and because reversal of the judg-
ment would preclude any further litigation on the relevant cause of action. Id.
at 101 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975)).
Again, this concern about the likely outcome of their decision makes the Uni-
versal Minerals analysis more pragmatic than rigid.
114. See Barclays-American/Business Credit, Inc. v. Radio WBHP, Inc. (In
re Dixie Broadcasting), 871 F.2d 1023, 1028-29 (11th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging
that Gardner would lead to a contrary result, but following its precedent in
Briglevich v. Rees, 847 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1986)). But see Thompson v. Ken-
tucky Lumber Co., 860 F.2d 674, 676 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Gardner without
explanation); Allegheny Int'l Credit Corp. v. Bowman, 821 F.2d 245, 247 n.1
(5th Cir. 1987) (arguing that the Gardner analysis was mistaken); Briglevich,
847 F.2d at 761 (acknowledging that the Gardner approach would lead to a
contrary result, but holding that the court was bound by precedent to the
Riggsby approach).
115. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 117.
1990] 1357
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE MARIN AND RIGGSBY
APPROACHES TO DETERMINING FINALITY
Both the Main and Riggsby approaches used by circuit
courts to determine what orders of a district court in bank-
ruptcy matters are final are flawed. Commentators and courts
alike recognize the shortcomings.1 7 A few courts are reluctant
to adopt either approach because they realize that neither ap-
proach leads to a just result in all situations." 8 No court or
commentator, however, has elucidated a clearer standard for
circuit courts to apply." 9 Gardner,120 although only sketchy in
117. See, e.g., Gardner, 810 F.2d at 90-91 (examining the conflict between
the Sambo's and Riggsby approaches); 1 W. COLLIER, supra note 60, 1 3.03[6][b]
(asserting that there are both inter and intra-circuit disputes on the issue of
finality for bankruptcy appeals from district to circuit courts, leaving the issue
hopelessly confused); Towber, supra note 11, at 589-90 (stating that many of
the cases that address finality for bankruptcy appeals from district to circuit
court fail to set guidelines for litigants to determine when their orders will be-
come final).
118. See Gardner, 810 F.2d at 91-92 (refusing to adopt either the Sambo's
approach, which developed from Matin, or the Riggsby approach).
119. See, e.g., Towber, supra note 11, at 611-13. Despite its title, this article
does not elucidate a clearer definition of finality. Towber argues that to avoid
some of the inequities of the finality decision, federal circuit courts, in deter-
mining whether a federal district court remand to bankruptcy is non-final,
should fashion an equitable decree to preserve the appealing party's right to be
made whole after subsequent review. Id at 611-12. In the alternative, Towber
argues that circuit courts should hear appeals from orders it deems to be non-
final when the legal issue raised on appeal is an important question of law or
procedure, the answer to which will affect management of the case. Id. at 613.
The Towber approach can not address all the inequities inherent in the pres-
ent circuit split.
Consider the plight of the New York businessperson in the introduction of
this Note. After the federal district court remands his case to the bankruptcy
court for further proceedings, he or she must return to the bankruptcy court
for those further proceedings. During that time, the New York business' pub-
lic image is tarnished by the ongoing bankruptcy litigation, while the New
Jersey businessperson is entitled to immediate review in the federal circuit
court of the federal district court's reversal and remand. The New Jersey
businessperson may prevail in the federal circuit court and the bankruptcy
case could be over. Under Towber's approach the New York businessperson
would be entitled to review only if the legal issue raised on review is an impor-
tant question of law or procedure. See id. at 612. Assuming it is not an impor-
tant question of law or procedure, the Towber approach offered only one
alternative: the federal circuit court can fashion an equitable decree to pre-
serve the New York businessperson's right to be made whole after subsequent
review. Id. at 611-12. The Towber approach does not adequately protect the
New York businessperson because no equitable decree can compensate the
New York businessperson for the worsened public image.




its analysis, might have served as a catalyst in developing a
third, more pragmatic approach to finality analysis, but courts
citing Gardner ignore its analysis.' 2 '
The limitations of the Mann and Riggsby approaches to fi-
nality must be analyzed to better understand how a new stan-
dard can be developed.
A. PROBLEM OF THE ARIn APPROACH
Mann held that a federal district court order reversing and
remanding a final order of a bankruptcy court also is a final or-
der for purposes of an appeal.32 2 There are several problems
inherent in the Mann approach. The most apparent problem is
its rigidity. Matin raised several important rationales for con-
sidering district court remands to bankruptcy court final.us
Several other courts echo those rationales.2 4 Unfortunately,
the Mann court and its progeny failed to recognize the limits of
their analysis.
The Manin court found that a desire to respect the distinc-
tion between trial courts and appellate courts is a primary rea-
son for interpreting finality narrowly.125 The court, however,
dismissed this concern because in bankruptcy matters the cir-
cuit court reviews the decision of a lower appellate court.2 6
The Matin court is only partly correct in asserting that concern
for the distinction between trial courts and appellate courts is
121. See United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925, 926 n.2 (6th Cir. 1989) (cit-
ing Gardner for the proposition that a federal district court's order is a final
decision unless the district court remands for a factual determination on an is-
sue central to the case (thus ignoring Gardner's balancing test)); Barclays-
American/Business Credit, Inc. v. Radio WBHP, Inc. (In re Dixie Broadcast-
ing, Inc.), 871 F.2d 1023, 1029 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Gardner for the proposi-
tion that a district court's remand of a bankruptcy case to a bankruptcy court
for determination whether an insurance release was fraudulent was a final or-
der (ignoring Gardner's ad hoc analysis)); Allegheny Int'l Credit Corp. v.
Bowman, 821 F.2d 245, 248 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987) (asserting that in Gardner the
Sixth Circuit adopted the Matin approach "with the exception that the district
court order is not final where it remands the case for a factual determination
on an issue central to the case").
122. Main Motor Oil, Inc. v. Michaels, 689 F.2d 445, 449 (3d Cir. 1982).
123. i at 448.
124. See, e.g., Sambo's Restaurant, Inc., v. Wheeler, Inc., 754 F.2d 811, 814-
15 (9th Cir. 1985) (relying on Matin analysis of finality to find the court had
jurisdiction over a bankruptcy appeal from district court); Bayer v. Nicola (In
re Bestmann), 720 F.2d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1983) (using Matin analysis of final-
ity to find the court had jurisdiction over a bankruptcy appeal from district
court).




inappropriate in bankruptcy appeals from district court to cir-
cuit court.
There are three reasons to respect the distinction between
trial courts and appellate courts: a desire not to interrupt pro-
ceedings in the trial court,7 a realization that most rulings
that precede factfinding are not reversedMs and an understand-
ing that an appellate court can satisfactorily identify the con-
trolling legal issues of a case only after factfinding is
complete.' 9 Only the first of these reasons, a desire not to in-
terrupt proceedings in the trial court, is inappropriate in bank-
ruptcy appeals from district courts to circuit courts. This Note
addresses situations in which a district court overturns and re-
mands for further proceedings what is admittedly a final order
of the bankruptcy court. It is impossible to interrupt the pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy court because proceedings on that order
are finished. Thus, as the Matin court maintains, concern for
the unique roles of the trial judge and appellate court may be
more inappropriate in bankruptcy appeals from a district court
to a circuit court than in appeals from a trial court to an appel-
late court.
Two of the rationales for respecting the unique role of the
trial judge are valid when the district court remands to the
bankruptcy court for further proceedings. The two valid ratio-
nales are that most rulings that precede factfinding are not re-
versed and that a court of appeals usually is able to
satisfactorily identify the controlling legal questions only after
factfinding is. complete.
Most rulings that precede factfinding are not reversed.130
If a district court remands for more factfinding, the ruling pre-
cedes factfinding and thus is unlikely to be reversed. Often a
court of appeals can only satisfactorily identify the controlling
legal questions after factfinding is complete.131 The circuit
court thus should wait until the additional factfinding ordered
by the district court is complete before hearing the legal issues
of a case.
In Matin, the court held that it need not worry about in-
terpreting finality broadly because the relatively liberal appeals
127. Id (citing 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRFSSMAN,
supra note 17, § 3907, at 434).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 17,
§ 3907, at 433.
131. See id. at 432-33.
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provisions of the old Bankruptcy Act were not unduly burden-
some.13 2 However, because clogged court calendars are com-
mon today, courts should be concerned about interpreting
finality broadly.133
Finally, the delay argument from Main 134 is unpersuasive
for two reasons. The court stated that delay caused by two ap-
peals may be overlooked because the initial appeal from the
bankruptcy court, not the appeal of the district court order, is
the primary cause of the delay.la5 This argument ignores the
reality that a long delay is often more disruptive and expensive
than a short one.13 On another level, this argument ignores
the inefficient use of judicial resources when two courts hear
different parts of one litigation concurrently rather than having
one court hear the whole case.
The efficiency argument from Sambo's, which followed the
reasoning of Main,13 is as simplistic as that made in Main.
The Sambo's court argued that focusing narrowly on the action
132. Matin, 689 F.2d at 449.
133. There has been tremendous growth in the number of appeals filed in
federal courts. The number filed in federal circuit courts almost quintupled
between 1960 and 1980, while the number of judges available to handle those
cases only doubled.
TABLE 1
GROWTH IN CASELOADS AND JUDGESHIPS IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 1960 - 1980
% Increase
% Increase of cases filed
% Increase in authorized over judgeships
in cases filed judgeships authorized
Supreme Court 118% 0% 118%
Courts of Appeals 495 94 401
District Courts 122 111 11
Howard, Query: Are Heavy Caseloads Changing the Nature of Appellate Jus-
tice?, 66 JUDICATURE 57, 58 (1982).
134. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
135. Matin, 689 F.2d at 449.
136. For example, the time requirements for corporate reorganizations
under the Bankruptcy Code expedite completion of reorganizations. See 11
U.S.C. § 1121 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 231, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6191. The Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion process alters contractual and property rights of creditors and other par-
ties. To prevent the parties from being irreparably harmed, the bankruptcy
court is authorized to conduct some proceedings on an accelerated basis. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 (d), (e), 1113(d) (1988). Long delays obviously thwart this
purpose.
137. See supra note 88.
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of the bankruptcy court is more efficient because litigation is
complete and the bankruptcy court has nothing more to do if
the court of appeals reverses the district court decision to re-
mand the case back to the bankruptcy court.'i This argument
ignores the fact that appellate courts reverse few rulings that
precede factfinding'3 9 Thus, in a majority of cases, the district
court's decision to remand the case to the bankruptcy court will
not be reversed. Matters in bankruptcy court ultimately will
have to proceed as the district court originally ordered. The
practical result of this approach is that appeal to the circuit
court of the district court's remand to the bankruptcy court for
further proceedings merely will have been delayed. 40
B. PROBLEMS OF THE RIGGSBY APPROACH
The more flexible approach used in Riggsby suffers many
of the same flaws as the Marin approach. Under the Riggsby
approach, a circuit court refuses an appeal from a district court
only when the district court remands the case to the bank-
ruptcy court for significant further proceedings.' 41 Although
the flexible approach may bend, it does not bend in the right
places. i 4' Courts applying the Riggsby approach focus on what
the bankruptcy court has yet to resolve, when they should fo-
cus upon the interests of the parties affected by the finality
decision.
The Riggsby court and other courts following it offer sev-
eral policy considerations to support their position.143 Like Ma-
138. See Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. Wheeler, Inc., 754 F.2d 811, 814 (9th
Cir. 1985).
139. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. CoopER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 17,
§ 3907, at 430.
140. Unless, of course, the appeal to the federal circuit court is entertained
while the proceedings in the bankruptcy court continue, as happened in Ma-
?in. See Matin, 689 F.2d at 449 n.2. In such a situation, the additional bank-
ruptcy court proceedings may not be delayed. That situation, however, is
subject to the same inefficiency arguments that make Manin's efficiency argu-
ment unconvincing. See supr, notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 96.
142. In fact, there is not as much difference between the "broad" Matin
approach and the "flexible" Riggsby approach as one might assume. Both
make narrow inquiries. The broad approach narrowly focuses on the action of
the bankruptcy court, ignoring the district court's remand to the federal bank-
ruptcy court for further proceedings. The flexible approach focuses on what
remains to be resolved in bankruptcy court on remand, and is flexible only
when routine ministerial tasks remain. Neither considers the practical effect
on the parties.
143. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
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rin and its progeny, however, the Riggsby line of cases fails to
recognize the limits of its analysis. The Riggsby court's analo-
gies to remand from a district court to an administrative
agency'44 and to remand from a higher to a lower state court'4
are particularly problematic.
One of the two analogies the Riggsby court used to support
its flexible approach involves remand to an administrative
agency. This analogy is inappropriate to support so objective an
approach to interpreting finality. Circuit courts decide the fi-
nality of remands by district courts to administrative agencies
using a highly subjective case-by-case approach. An order by a
district court remanding an administrative appeal for further
proceedings before an agency usually is non-appealable only if
the order will be reviewable on appeal from the agency's final
decision.146 If an order will be unreviewable after the agency's
final decision, the circuit courts apply a pragmatic approach to
the finality requirement and hear the appeal from the district
court.147 The Riggsby approach seemingly would not allow
such an escape device. The analogy to a very flexible, subjec-
tive approach is inappropriate in support of the much less flexi-
ble, more objective Riggsby approach.
The analogy the Riggsby court draws between remand
from a district court to a bankruptcy court and Supreme Court
review of state court decisions is even weaker. The Riggsby
court noted that Supreme Court review of state court decisions
usually does not include remand from a higher to a lower state
court.148 There are, however, several situations in which the
Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction over a case without await-
ing completion of additional proceedings on remand in the
lower state court.149 One situation is when further proceedings
144. Suburban Bank v. Riggsby, 745 F.2d 1153, 1156 (7th Cir. 1984); see
supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
145. Riggsby, 745 F.2d at 1156. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
146. Riggsby, 745 F.2d at 1156. The Riggsby court found this exception was
no problem in the case before it. Id. at 1156. This exception to agency re-
mands, however, could significantly alter the applicability of this analogy to
many cases in which the order effectively will not be reviewable on appeal
from the bankruptcy judge's final decision.
147. United Steelworkers v. Union R.R., 648 F.2d 905, 910-11 (3d Cir. 1981).
148. Riggsby, 745 F.2d at 1156 (citing O'Dell v. Espinoza, 456 U.S. 430, 430
(1982) (per curiam); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 216 n.8 (1977);
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477-85 (1975).
149. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 477-85 (detailing the four categories of cases in
which the court will treat a decision on a federal issue as a final judgment
without awaiting the completion of the additional proceedings ordered for the
lower state court).
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on the state claim remain and the federal claim has been de-
cided finally, but later review of the federal issue will be impos-
sible regardless of the outcome of the case.1s°  Another
situation is when a state court makes a final decision on a fed-
eral issue and a refusal immediately to review the state court
decision could seriously erode a federal policy.151 In both of
these instances, the Supreme Court uses a pragmatic interpre-
tation of finality to avoid inequities that might result from the
finality decision. The Riggsby approach has no similar "safety
devices" and its reliance on this analogy of state court remands
to lower courts is therefore misplaced.
The principal advantage of the Riggsby approach is that it
allows the circuit court to exercise some pragmatism. Courts
can avoid harmful delays when only ministerial tasks remain
for the bankruptcy court to consider.152 Of course, any appel-
late system should exist to serve the interests of the parties in-
volved.153 By narrowly focusing its inquiry on what remains to
be done by the bankruptcy court, the Riggsby approach ignores
150. See California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Stewart, the Supreme
Court of California reversed appellant's conviction on federal constitutional
grounds and remanded to the lower court for a new trial. Id. at 498. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed, applying a pragmatic interpretation of
finality because an acquittal of the defendant at trial would have precluded,
under state law, an appeal by the state. I&L at 498 n.7.
151. See Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 432-83. In Cox Broadcasting, the ap-
pellant reporter broadcast a rape victim's name, which he had obtained from
public records. The victim's father brought a damages action under a Georgia
statute that made it a misdemeanor to broadcast a rape victim's name. At
trial, the court held the reporter violated the Georgia statute. Id. at 474. The
Georgia Supreme Court held the trial court erred in construing the statute to
extend a cause of action for invasion of privacy, but found the complaint stated
a cause of action for common law invasion of privacy. Id. The Georgia
Supreme Court further held that the first and fourteenth amendments did
not, as a matter of law, require judgment for appellants. Id. at 475. On motion
for rehearing, the appellants charged that the victim's name could be pub-
lished with impunity because it was a matter of public interest. The Georgia
Supreme Court denied the motion and upheld the statute as a legitimate limi-
tation on the first amendment's guarantee of free speech. Id.
The United States Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction over the
case, in part because if appellants prevailed at trial and made consideration of
the federal constitutional question unnecessary it would "leave unanswered an
important question of freedom of the press under the First Amendment... an
uneasy and unsettled constitutional posture [that] could only further harm the
operation of a free press." ML at 485-86 (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247 n.6 (1974)).
152. See Riggsby, 745 F.2d at 1156.
153. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process,
94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1646 (1985) (stating that our appellate system exists to en-
sure fairness to parties).
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the damage to the interests of the parties that can be caused by
the circuit court's finality decision.l r4 Although the flexible ap-
proach may better respect the distinct roles of the trial and ap-
pellate courts, the benefit may be lost if the parties' interests
are seriously harmed by the decision.
IV. FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF GARDNER AND




The solution to the unfairness caused by unsound ap-
proaches to finality analysis currently used by the circuit courts
and the present circuit split is to adopt a pragmatic approach.
The circuit courts should adopt the ad hoc approach to deter-
mining finality used or advocated in many non-bankruptcy con-
texts.'-' Circuit courts should follow the result-oriented
analytical approach hinted at by the Sixth Circuit in In re
154. Applying the Riggsby approach to the introductory hypothetical at the
beginning of this Note, the New York businessperson would be required to re-
turn to the bankruptcy court, complete the further proceedings ordered by the
federal district court, and incur additional legal fees before appeal could be
had in the federal circuit court, unless the appeal was for simple, administra-
tive tasks. During that time, the New York business' public image may be tar-
nished irreparably by the continuing bankruptcy proceedings. The Riggsby
approach does not consider the possible damage to the litigant's interests.
Under the approach advocated by this Note, the federal circuit court could
consider evidence of the likely effect on the litigants' public image of the delay
caused by denying immediate appeal. If the federal circuit court found this
danger outweighed the dangers of piecemeal review, the federal circuit court
could exercise jurisdiction.
155. Of course, this problem involves a value judgment about which inter-
est should prevail, respect for our legal structure or respect for the parties' in-
terests. Respect for our legal structure should not be automatic but should
spring from a belief that the structure typically leads to just results. In a situ-
ation in which the legal structure often leads to unfair outcomes, the reason
behind such respect fails. We should respect legal process when it leads, most
often, to just outcomes.
156. The approach advocated in this Note is similar to the flexible ap-
proaches to interpreting finality used in other contexts. See supra notes 32-41
and accompanying text (discussing Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379
U.S. 148 (1964), which advocates a broad, pragmatic approach to finality for all
appeals from federal district courts to federal circuit courts); supra notes 105-
14 and accompanying text (discussing Breyfogle v. Grange Mut. Casualty Co.
(In re Gardner), 810 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1987), which advocates ad hoc decision
making in interpreting the finality requirement for bankruptcy appeals from
federal district courts to federal circuit courts); see also supra notes 152-53 and
accompanying text (examining the result-oriented approach to the finality re-




A pragmatic approach to finality analysis would allow the
courts to use the Riggsby and Mann approaches merely as
guidelines and then to examine the effect of their finality deci-
sion on the litigants in each case.1as The circuit courts should
weigh the potential harm to the litigants' interests against the
inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review.159 This approach
would allow circuit courts to be sensitive to the weaknesses in
the Matin and Riggsby approaches. 60 The Gardner court
faintly sketched out the details of this approach.16' The fuller
picture provided in this Note can help guide subsequent finality
decisions.
Among the factors a court of appeals ought to consider in
interpreting finality under a pragmatic approach are whether
the decision will be reviewable after remand, the potential
harm to the litigants' personal or financial situation from the
delay caused by an appeal, 62 and the likelihood that the order
being appealed ultimately will be reversed. 63
Both the Mann court and the Gardner court were con-
text (examining the flexible approach to the finality requirement for remands
to lower state courts).
157. 810 F.2d 87, 90-92 (6th Cir. 1987). A pragmatic approach to finality
analysis in bankruptcy appeals echoes Justice Black's language from Gillespie,
that "in deciding the question of finality the most important competing consid-
erations are 'the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand
and the danger of denying justice on the other."' 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964)
(quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 388 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)).
158. This is similar to the approach used in Gillespie. See supra notes 32-
41.
159. In some large bankruptcy cases, the harm to the litigant's interest
caused by delay from denying immediate appeal from a federal district court's
reversal and remand of the bankruptcy court's order will be insubstantial be-
cause the larger bankruptcy case can continue for many years after the time
when the disputed ruling is appealed to the federal circuit court.
160. See supra notes 125-44 and accompanying text (analyzing weaknesses
of the Mann approach); supra notes 145-62 (examining weaknesses of the
Riggsby approach).
161. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
162. Of course, creditors are harmed when the debtor's assets are depleted
by legal fees resulting from protracted litigation.
163. These factors make up a test similar to the test commonly applied by a
court in deciding whether to issue a temporary injunction. A court's discretion
in deciding whether to grant a temporary injunction must be guided by consid-
ering four factors: the likelihood and type of harm to the plaintiff if a prelimi-
nary injunction is denied, the harm an injunction might inflict upon the
defendant, the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits, and whether
granting the injunction will disserve the public interest. See Signode Corp. v.
Weld-Loc Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d 1108, 1111 (7th Cir. 1983).
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cerned that reversal of the district court's judgment would pre-
clude further litigation.164 Concern for whether the decision
will be reviewable after remand animates the Supreme Court's
flexible approach to review of state court remands to lower
state courts.16 If a decision is appealable later, courts have less
reason to consider it final. If the decision is not appealable
later, the circuit court should consider it final and hear the
appeal.
Even though denying jurisdiction may not lead to a long
delay before a more final judgment is issued by the bankruptcy
court, the delay may cause serious economic consequences for
the party seeking immediate review at the circuit court level
because of the uncertainty surrounding his or her financial
soundness.3- Further, the accumulation of legal fees during a
corporate reorganization can make long delays extremely ex-
pensive for both the debtor and the unsecured creditors.167 If
potentially serious harm could result from the delay caused by
a remand, the circuit court should exercise jurisdiction over an
appeal.16
164. Marin, 689 F.2d at 448; Gardner, 810 F.2d at 92.
165. See supra note 30.
166. For example, customers may not be willing to enter contracts with the
New York businessperson in this Note's introductory hypothetical while the
bankruptcy proceedings continue on remand to the bankruptcy court. The
New Jersey businessperson may terminate bankruptcy litigation much sooner
because in the Third Circuit she has a right to immediate appeal of the district
court's reversal and remand of the bankruptcy court's final order. Customers
who may have done business may decide that it is safer to cross the Hudson
River and do business with the New Jersey businessperson because the New
Jersey business is no longer involved in bankruptcy litigation and thus appears
to be less risky. The New York businessperson will be penalized by this cir-
cuit split in finality analysis for bankruptcy appeals from federal district court
to federal circuit court even though Congress intends bankruptcy procedure to
be uniform throughout the United States. See supra note 7 (discussing Con-
gress' power to make uniform bankruptcy laws).
167. The Bankruptcy Code grants special treatment to attorneys fees in-
curred by parties to the case and requires that those fees be paid prior to any
distribution to the unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 1129(a)(9)(1988).
168. Under the approach advocated by this Note, if delay caused by the fur-
ther proceedings ordered by the federal district court to occur in the bank-
ruptcy court will seriously deplete the resources of the debtor's estate and
deprive creditors of fair compensation, the circuit court should exercise juris-
diction. If the circuit court exercises jurisdiction and overturns the district
court's reversal and remand the proceeding will be finished and the debtor's
estate will be preserved.
Similar concern for the effects of delay in bankruptcy motivated the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida to permit
sale of a debtor's store and warehouse free and clear of security interests of
any secured creditors. See Seidle v. Southeast First Nat'l Bank of Miami (In re
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Circuit courts should consider the likelihood that the order
being appealed ultimately will be reversed. 69 Of course, it
would be counterproductive to have an appellate court make a
lengthy examination of the merits of an attempted appeal only
to have it decide that the effort it had just expended was un-
necessary. The circuit courts should develop a limited process,
to be used in place of a full examination of the merits of a case,
to determine whether an appeal presents an issue that likely
was wrongly decided by the district court. Courts already have
experience judging the likelihood that a litigant's claim will
prevail when a litigant attempts to obtain interlocutory review
under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) 70 or when a litigant attempts to obtain
a temporary injunction.' 7 ' If it is likely that the district court
will be reversed, the circuit court has another compelling rea-
son for exercising jurisdiction over an appeal.
The solution this Note proposes blurs the question of what
district court decisions are appealable, and therefore encour-
Medina's Men's Shop, Inc.), 7 Bankr. 102 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). In Medina's,
the debtor's store had been burglarized and vandalized repeatedly during the
pendency of the bankruptcy litigation. The court reasoned that if the property
in the store were not sold immediately, the creditors would be harmed by the
repeated burglaries. Id. at 103. In addition, the court allowed sale of the
debtor's real estate to be sold because selling the real estate along with the
contents of the store would reduce the costs of the sale and thus benefit the
creditors. Id. at 103.
169. The less likely the district court will be reversed, the less likely jus-
tice will be denied by delay and the greater the chance of causing harm to the
litigants by piecemeal appeal. If there is little doubt that the district court re-
versal and remand was correct, then the dangers of wasted time, effort, and
money resulting later from a possible reversal of the bankruptcy court's deci-
sion are greatly reduced. Of course, as the danger of wasted effort in the trial
court decreases, the danger of wasted time, effort, and money in the appellate
court increases.
170. Section 1292(b) allows federal circuit courts to exercise discretion in
deciding whether to hear interlocutory appeals. One of the rationales for per-
mitting the exercise of discretion is that the appellate court can estimate the
likelihood of error, and the burden upon its own docket. Hearings on Appeals
From Interlocutory Orders & Conftnement in Jail-Type Institutions Before the
Subcomm No. 3 of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d. Sess.,
21 (1958) (statement of Hon. Judge Albert B. Morris, United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, Philadelphia, Pa.).
171. To grant a temporary injunction, a court must consider how likely a
plaintiff is to succeed, because the answer affects the relative balance of harm
that must be shown. Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380,
387 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.)(arguing that "[t]he more likely the plaintiff is
to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in his favor [to issue a




ages questionable appeals. 72 Obviously, given the already
clogged circuit court calendars, questionable appeals should not
be encouraged.173 Using a summary procedure could amelio-
rate the damage such blurring causes.
A pragmatic approach to the finality requirement in bank-
ruptcy appeals would better serve the interests of the parties to
the litigation because unnecessary delays will be curtailed and
harm to the litigants' personal or financial situation will be
minimized. This approach more wisely uses judicial resources.
It reduces the unnecessary duplication of judicial effort that oc-
curs whenever a district court decision that is likely to be over-
turned can not be reviewed immediately because it must await
a "more final" disposition.
Moreover, the sponsor of section 158(d), which governs
bankruptcy appeals from federal district courts to federal cir-
cuit courts, intended it to continue "traditional appellate re-
view."'' 74 The two dominant approaches circuit courts use to
interpret section 158(d) are unlike any of the approaches used
to interpret when an order is final in other legal contexts. 7 5 A
rule that allows a circuit court to consider the impact of its in-
terpretation of finality on the litigants in a bankruptcy appeal
is akin to the interpretation of finality used in administrative
appeals,176 in appeals from state courts to the Supreme
Court,177 and advocated for non-bankruptcy appeals from dis-
trict court to circuit court in Gilles Ye7 8
CONCLUSION
Appeals from a bankruptcy court usually are to a federal
district court, which reviews the decision of the bankruptcy
court. Appeals from final decisions of the district court go to
the circuit court. The circuits disagree on what constitutes a fi-
nal decision for purposes of appeal from a district court to a cir-
172. Blurring this question could encourage dubious appeals by parties ea-
ger either for review or to delay the district court proceedings.
173. See supra note 137 (charting the growth in the number of appeals filed
in federal circuit courts between 1960 and 1980).
174. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 14-45 and accompanying text (describing finality anal-
ysis in non-bankruptcy contexts).
176. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text (advocating a broad, re-
sult-oriented approach to finality for non-bankruptcy appeals from federal dis-
trict courts to federal circuit courts).
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cult court in the bankruptcy context. Some circuits follow the
Riggsby approach and refuse to hear bankruptcy appeals from a
district court when the district court remands the case to the
bankruptcy court for significant further proceedings. Other cir-
cuits follow the Marin approach and hold that a district court's
order reversing a final order of the bankruptcy court also is a
final order. Neither the Matin approach nor the Riggsby ap-
proach to finality adequately serves the interest of justice in
every situation. The Gillespie and Gardner decisions sketch
the outline of an alternative approach to finality analysis that is
better able to achieve just results. Both of these cases, how-
ever, are largely ignored.
A circuit court faced with an appeal from a district court
remand ordering the case to a bankruptcy court should deter-
mine the degree of harm to the litigant that would ensue if an
order were found non-final and appellate review denied. If se-
rious harm would result, circuit courts should exercise jurisdic-
tion. This pragmatic and subjective approach to finality
analysis in bankruptcy appeals under section 158(d) would re-
semble finality analysis currently used in non-bankruptcy ap-
peals and would be superior to the present inconsistent
approaches now used by the circuit courts.
Joseph Mitzel
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